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Abstract
An anomaly detection procedure is defined and its sta-
tistical performance are carefully quantified. It is based on
a non Gaussian modeling of the marginal distributions of
random projections (sketches) of traffic aggregated jointly
at different levels (multiresolution). To evaluate false neg-
ative vs. false positive in a controlled, reproducible and
documented framework, we apply the detection procedure
to traffic time-series from our self-made anomaly database.
It is obtained by performing DDoS-type attacks, using real-
world attack tools, over a real operational network. Also,
we illustrate that combining sketches enables us to identify
the target IP destination address and faulty packets hence
opening the track to attack mitigation.
1 Motivations and Contributions
Motivations. Internet is becoming the major and universal
communication network. It allows an increasing number of
different activities of continuously evolving natures, rang-
ing from on-line games, video-on-demand or IP voice tele-
phony to web browsing or file exchanges. This implies ac-
commodating the circulation of data with very different na-
tures (texts, images, sounds,...), with wide variations in their
characteristics (file sizes,...) and with demanding and po-
tentially antagonist constraints and requirements (real-time,
acceptable delays or loss-rates, security levels, confidential-
ity levels, tarifications...). These many causes of diversity
in nature result in Internet Traffic flows that naturally ex-
hibit huge fluctuations around putative average behaviors.
On top of this inherent large variability are potentially su-
perimposed non stationarities such as seasonal effects (day,
nights, weekends,...) or such as harder to describe and
burstier in nature events (flash crowds,...). Accompanying
its increase of popularity and its being massively and di-
versely used, Internet becomes a place where vulnerability
and security constitute central issues. Indeed, it has been
observed that Internet is subject to a continuously increas-
ing and diversifying variety of threads and attacks. Defense
against attacks implies to detect their occurrence, to classify
their nature or impact and to identify their origins to activate
appropriate reaction mechanisms. Attack detection and mit-
igation is hence a major research area in Internet traffic anal-
ysis. Whatever the signal processing techniques chosen to
perform anomaly detection (see [1, 5, 6, 12] for reviews and
descriptions of the most prominent ones), a detection pro-
cedure always relies on the following key ingredients. First,
traffic is characterized using a well-chosen (statistical) de-
scription model. This means not only to determine the av-
erage behavior of the (parameters of the) models under reg-
ular (attack-less) conditions but also to evaluate accurately
the characteristics of their inevitably large variabilities and
complex statistical properties. Second, a (statistical) dis-
tance between the parameters of the models estimated un-
der attacks and those characterizing the normal conditions
are computed. Third, it is necessary to decide when this dis-
tance is large, hence yielding a detection. This is where the
fluctuations under normal conditions needs to be accurately
analyzed. Then, the statistical performance of the proce-
dure are to be validated via the production of detection rate
versus false alarm rates curves. To finish with, detection
procedures can be complemented with techniques enabling
the identification of the origins of the attack.
Contributions. We propose here a detection procedure
based on the use of a multiresolution and non Gaussian sta-
tistical modeling [10] of the marginals distributions of ran-
dom projections (sketches) [4, 7, 9] aggregated at different
resolution levels (cf. Section 3). Detections are obtained
by the use of distances, computed from these statistics (cf.
Section 4). The use of a combined collection of sketches
enables us to identify the faulty packets. This inversion or
identification procedure is detailed in Section 6.
In the present work, we intend to detect low volume attacks.
We are not interested in situations where, because of the
distributed nature of nowadays attacks, the traffic volume
increase they yield close to the target is large. Indeed, for
such situations, detection is easy (and does not require ad-
vanced signal processing analyses) but takes places too late:
Impacts on network performance, Quality of Service degra-
dation and waste of resources are already high. Instead, we
consider detection at early stages of the attacks and close
to the sources when the traffic volume increase and the net-
#id Tool #bots #Total(Attack) pkt/s Intensity throughput
1 UDP 2 1098(74) 7% 200kb/s
2 UDP 4 3640(148) 4% 388kb/s
3 UDP 4 2190(148) 7% 388kb/s
4 TCP-SYN 2 4258(520) 12% 166kb/s
5 ICMP 4 1099(92) 8% 288kb/s
6 ICMP 4 1820(179) 10% 388kb/s
7 Mixed 4 2781(760) 27% 250kb/s
8 Smurf 4 2501(95) 4% 250kb/s
Table 1. ANOMALY DATABASE: CHARACTERIS-
TICS OF THE ATTACKS. All attacks are ob-
tained using Tfn2k, except the one on first
line (Trin00). All illustrations reported here
are obtained from the trace of last line (#id 8).
work degradation impacts caused by the illegitimate traffic
remain invisible and negligible. This can be seen as the case
where a router collects the packets generated by of a small
number of bots. Because we want to be able to assess the
statistical performance of the proposed detection procedure
in a comparable and reproducible manner, we have chosen
an approach that consists of a trade-off: We work with real
traffic collected on an operational network (RENATER) and
real DDoS type attacks performed with real-world attack
tool [3]. However, they are performed by ourselves in a
controlled manner (cf. Section 2) hence enabling false pos-
itive vs. false negative evaluation (cf. Section 5).
2 Anomaly Database
Attacks were performed using Trin00 and Tfn2k, two
well-known real world tools commonly involved in com-
puter network attacks. While Trin00 daemons create only
UDP packet flooding attacks, Tfn2k consists of a more ver-
satile tool enabling various types of DDoS attacks: UDP
flooding, TCP/SYN flooding, ICMP/Echo flooding, combi-
nation of these three methods, SMURF (sending Echo pack-
ets to a broadcast adress, replacing the IP of the sender with
the one of the victim) and Targa3 (malformatted packets).
For reasons made clear above, attacks are kept very low in
volume and have no significant impact on network perfor-
mance (and hence cannot be subsumed to global mean or
variance elementary changes). Attacks were conducted on
the real operational RENATER network (the French high
speed network used by research and education institutions),
and involved attacking machines hosted in four different
sites in France, while the attacked machine consists of a
single computer. Attacks are conducted during afternoon
hours, and are mixed with real, legitimate, internet traffic.
Attacks typically last 10 minutes and traffic is collected be-
fore and after, during an hour. These campaigns of experi-
ments, whose descriptions are summarized in Table 1, pro-
vide us with a labeled database of real traffic traces con-
taining low intensity bandwidth controlled and documented
anomalies. Fig. 2, top left, presents one such trace.
3 Modeling
Multiresolution-Gamma Modeling. Aggregated traffic
X∆ is not in general Gaussian and its marginal probability
density function (PDF) f∆(x) is likely to vary both with the
aggregation level ∆ and the degree of traffic multiplexing.
In [10], we proposed to describe f∆(x) by means of Gamma
distributions, f∆(x) = xα−1e−x/β/(Γ(α)βα). A Gamma
random variable is characterized by its scale and shape pa-
rameters β > 0, and α > 0. By modeling jointly a collec-
tion of aggregation levels ∆s, the Multiresolution-Gamma
Modeling proposed here catches not only the marginal dis-
tributions of the aggregated traffic but also its time corre-
lation structure. Indeed, X∆ being an uncorrelated time-
series would yield α∆ = α0∆ and β∆ = β0. Therefore,
any departure from these elementary behaviors with respect
to ∆ constitutes a signature of the time correlations in X∆
(cf. [10] for details).
Random Projections or Sketches. Inspired from [4, 7, 9],
we split traces by means of random projections, or sketches,
obtained as the outputs of H different M -output hash tables.
Hash functions are constructed using the fast-tabulation
method of [11]. Here, Hash functions are applied to the
IP destination (IPdst): mi = hn(IPdsti) ∈ {1, ...,M},
where {i, ti} refers to the i-th packet of the trace and to
its arrival time. This can straightforwardly be extended by
hashing the remainder of the 5-tuple of the IP header. The
m-th outputs of the n-th sketch are aggregated yielding the
Xn,m∆ (t) time series. Fig. 2 presents examples of sketches
(left column) and shows that the Multiresolution-Gamma
Modeling detailed above equally relevantly describes the
entire trace X∆ and the sketch outputs Xn,m∆ (t), both for
regular traffic and traffic with anomalies. Unlike for the en-
tire trace, the anomaly is clearly apparent, here in output
m = 20, validating the intuition that sketching highlights
the anomaly and hence increases the Signal to Noise Ratio
for the detection procedure.
4 Detection
Intuitions. The central empirical observation is reported in
Fig. 1: drastic changes in the shape (not only in the value)
of αn,m∆ take place when attacks occur. This is clearly seen
on the sketch output containing the attack (m = 20 here),
while no change is visible for other sketch outputs. This
change in αn,m∆ as a function j = log2 ∆ betrays a sharp
modification in the short-time correlations of the traffic, and
not only in its mean or standard deviations. Tracking this
correlation structure alteration consists of the core of the
detection procedure described below.
Distances. Traces under analysis are split into adjacent
non overlapping time windows of length T . Indepen-
dently for each time window and each aggregation level,
one computes a Mean Quadratic Distance (MQD) be-
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Figure 1. MULTIRESOLUTION GAMMA PARAME-
TERS. Evolution of αn,m∆ with respect to ∆ for
3 sketch outputs. Time windows containing
the attack are marked in (red, ’o’). Attack (lo-
cated in m = 20) is clearly betrayed by a sig-
nificant change in the shape of αn,m∆ .
tween α∆ and β∆ measured on the current time window
l and on a a priori chosen reference window, Dα(l) =
1
J
∑J
j=1 (αˆ2j (l)− αˆ2j (ref))2, the definition for Dβ is
identical, mutatis mutandis: Other distances can be used
(see e.g., [2]). For instance, Kullback divergences (KD)
between the PDFs f∆,l and f∆,Ref are defined as [2]:
K
(1d)
∆ (l) =
∫
(f∆,l − f∆,Ref )(ln f∆,l − ln f∆,Ref )dx.
K
(1d)
∆ s at various ∆s are combined to produce multiresolu-
tion distances. Multidimensional KD between f∆,∆′,l and
f∆,∆′,Ref can also be computed (cf. [10]).
Alarms. Finally, distances are thresholded to yield alarms.
5 Performance
Parameter Setting. Here, T = 1min and J = 9, i.e.,
∆ = {21, . . . , 29} ∗ 5ms. We use 2 ≤ H ≤ 10 differ-
ent hash functions (conceived from known initial random
seeds), with 5 ≤ M ≤ 50. The reference is computed
from the entire traffic collected before and after the self-
made anomaly, and therefore assumed to be regular traffic.
Distances as a response to attacks. Fig. 2 displays dis-
tances computed for the entire trace and 3 different sketch
outputs. For m = 20, the distances clearly yield unam-
biguous alarms for each 1min time-windows during the
anomaly. This is relevant as output m = 20 contains the
anomaly (this is easily checked as the target IP address
is chosen a priori). Also, one notices that clear changes
in mean or variance can be seen in other sketch outputs
(m = 1, 27 shown here). Interestingly enough, the dis-
tances do not raise alarms for those cases. It clearly illus-
trates that to correctly distinguish anomalies from a mere
increase of traffic, correlations are to be taken into account,
hence the interest of the Multiresolution-Gamma modeling.
Fig. 2 clearly shows that the anomaly is detected within its
1st or 2nd minute of occurrence, i.e., extremely quickly.
False Positive vs. False Negative. Statistical performance
for detection procedures are usually assessed via Probabil-
ity of Detection vs. Probability of False Alarm curves, such
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Figure 2. DISTANCES. Trace aggregated at ∆ =
1s, top: total traffic, bottom: Sketch Outputs
m = 1, 20, 27. Left to right: MQD Dα and K1d∆
distances, for ∆ = 10ms and ∆ = 40ms, as
functions of time. Anomaly (here, in m = 20)
clearly yields large values of the distances,
hence detections. Note that the distances do
not take large values despite the clear shift in
means observed in sketches m = 1, 27 alarms
and hence do not trigger false negatives.
as those reported in Fig. 3. A collection of threshold values
λ are used. For each λ, an alarm is triggered for the time-
windows l where the distance bypasses λ. Then, our docu-
mented database enables us to count the number of correct
and incorrect alarms. These results are extremely satisfac-
tory, with false alarm rates below the percent for high detec-
tion rates for MQD distance Dα despite the fact that attacks
have very low intensity and can hardly be seen. Kullback
distances yield even better results (cf. Fig 3).
Confidence level. From the database and the use of the
traces when no anomaly occurs, one can estimate the PDF
of the distances under regular conditions. From this, the de-
tection procedure can not only output a decision (alarm is
triggered or not) but also its confidence level (the so-called
p-value). This will be detailed elsewhere, together with fur-
ther improvements obtained from consecutive threshold by-
passes.
6 Target and Faulty Packet Identification
.
Because sketches sort the traffic, they can be involved in
target and faulty packet identification. However, inverting
the sketch procedure implies the use of a collection of H
different hash functions, each with M outputs. Essentially,
an IP destination address (IPdst) potentially identifies the
attack target, if ∀n = 1, . . . , H , mAn = hn(IPdsti) where
NIP H = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
83629 2054 51 2 1 1 1 1
232 107148219 2677374 67432 1719 51 1 1
Table 2. IDENTIFICATION: Number of IP iden-
tified as the potential target, function of the
numbers of sketches used and the number of
IP addresses monitored (83629 in the trace).
mAn stands for the output number of the n-th sketch pro-
cedure where an alarm is triggered. Obviously, the sketch
procedure is prone to collisions (different IPdst share the
same sketch outputs), and a large enough number H of
sketches is required to ensure an ambiguity-less inversion.
The use of k-universal (with k ≥ 2) hash functions plays
here a key role, as it ensures that the average number of
collisions (between any IPdst and that of the attack target)
diminishes exponentially fast with the number of sketches
H [8]: #C = NIPM−2H , where NIP denote the num-
ber of IP addresses in the analyzed traffic. Moreover with
k ≥ 4, the variance of #C remains equally low. Obviously,
to ensure a one-to-one identification, #C needs to be kept
low (below 1). In practice, in this work, NIP  217  232,
with k = 4, and M = 40, H = 4 is large enough (cf. Table
2). The computational efficiency of the table-based hashing
procedure virtually enables to apply the inversion procedure
to each of the 232 possible IP addresses, in a couple of min-
utes. However, this can be further improved by retaining
only the IPdsts actually appearing in the analyzed traffic.
A list containing all IPdsts currently observed is kept. This
list can be flushed regularly, as long as no anomaly is de-
tected. IP address target identifications opens the track for
faulty packet identification. This is a promising research
direction being currently developed and implemented.
7 Conclusions and Perspectives
This work shows that the proposed detection procedure,
tracking a local correlation change in traffic via a multireso-
lution Gamma modeling combined with a sketch procedure,
is able to detect attacks even with very low intensity levels.
Using our self-made documented anomaly database, we are
able to assess its statistical performance in a controlled and
reproducible manner. Also, the detection procedure outputs
the identification of the attack target, hence enabling reac-
tion and mitigation.
For sketch analysis, the fast-tabulation method of [11] is
scalable for more loaded networks. Therefore, the full pro-
cedure, combining hash, multiresolution modeling (imple-
mented by the wavelet pyramidal algorithm) and distances
computed over sliding windows, can potentially be imple-
mented on-line. Furthermore, automatic choices of the ref-
erence time-window (based on non-stationary signal pro-
cessing methods) and of the threshold are considered, to-
gether with multi-point measurements. Such further devel-
opments are under current investigations.
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Figure 3. DETECTION VS. FALSE ALARM RATES.
T = 1min. For distance Dα and for attacks #id
3(7%,*), 4(12%,), 6(10%,+), 7(27%,), 8(4%,o)
in Table 1. For 8(4%,o), dashed and mixed
lines correspond to K1d∆ , with ∆ = 10ms and
∆ = 40ms, for comparison.
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